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EDUCATIONAL FINANCING MANDATES IN
CALIFORNIA: REALLOCATING THE COST OF
EDUCATING IMMIGRANTS BETWEEN STATE
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES
I. INTRODUCTION
Perhaps no two public policy issues have generated more
public debate in recent years than immigration and educa-
tion. ' Following the arrival of nine million immigrants in the
United States during the 1980's,2 another 8.9 million immi-
grants were admitted during the first four years of the
1990's.3 The immigrants' impact on employment opportuni-
ties and the economy,4 on public revenues and expenditures,
5
on cultural values and racial divisions,6 has been the subject
of much dispute. One link between these issues has been the
controversy over the societal role of education and the bur-
dens immigration places on educational financing. 7 For ex-
1. See generally JULIAN L. SIMON, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF IMMI-
GRATION (1989); STANLEY ARONOWITZ & HENRY GIRoux, EDUCATION UNDER
SIEGE: THE CONSERVATIVE, LIBERAL, AND RADICAL DEBATE OVER SCHOOLING
(1985).
2. Daniel B. Wood, Confronting California's Immigration Issue, THE
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Oct. 4, 1993, at 12; see LORRAINE M. McDONNELL
& PAUL T. HILL, NEWCOMERS IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS: MEETING THE EDUCA-
TIONAL NEEDS OF IMMIGRANT YOUTH at ix (1993).
3. Robert Reinhold, A Welcome for Immigrants Turns to Resentment, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 25, 1993, at Al.
4. A July 1993 Gallup poll showed that 27% of respondents indicated that
immigration should stop until the economy improves. Wood, supra note 2, at
12. However, studies have suggested that job losses are the result of trade defi-
cits and manufacturers moving overseas rather than of immigration. GEORGE
BORJAS ET AL., ON THE LABOR MARKET EFFECTS OF IMMIGRATION AND TRADE 5
(1991).
5. A Rice University study shows that, since 1970, immigrants have cost
governmental entities $45 billion per year more than they have paid in taxes.
Wood, supra note 2, at 12. Yet critics point out that other studies indicate im-
migrants contribute more money in taxes than they receive in government ben-
efits. Frank Trejo, Hispanic Officials, Organizers Meet to Fight Anti-Immigrant
Views, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 9, 1994, at A6.
6. See Suzanne Espinosa & Benjamin Pimentel, Backlash Against Asians,
Latinos, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 27, 1993, at Al; Judy MacLean, Is Immigration the
Problem?, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 26, 1993, at A25.
7. See Daniel M. Weintraub & Ralph Frammolino, Wilson to Call for Col-
lege Fee Hikes, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1994, at Al; California Politicos Seek to Curb
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ample, with the overburdened metropolitan school districts of
New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, and Miami enrolling nearly
100,000 new students each year who are immigrants or the
children of immigrants,8 an issue has arisen concerning the
districts' capacity to accommodate the needs of society in gen-
eral and students in particular.' In an age of budget con-
straints,10 these districts are confronted with additional ob-
stacles to providing students a basic education.
The concern with the effects of immigration has been es-
pecially prominent in California, which grew in population by
6.1 million during the 1980's (thirty-seven percent of that
growth attributable to immigration) and, in the years since
1989, has received an additional influx of 3.2 million legal im-
migrants.'1 In particular, political issues include the state's
ability to educate its citizens,12 the fiscal requirements of
maintaining a public education system during an economic
recession, the costs associated with including the children of
immigrants within such a system, and the role of the federal
government with regard to illegal immigration and education
funding. 13 Despite the wide breadth of these topics, however,
there has been little discussion of the legal structure which
provides the underlying basis for any governmental role in
the resolution of these matters, or of the existing legal rela-
tionships between governmental entities whose functions in-
clude implementation of federal and state mandates regard-
ing these issues. In short, where political questions exist,
Illegal Immigration, National Public Radio, May 17, 1993, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, NPR File.
8. 1 IRIS C. ROTBERG, RAND INSTITUTE ON EDUCATION AND TRAINING, FED-
ERAL POLICY OPTIONS FOR IMPROVING THE EDUCATION OF Low-INCOME STUDENTS
7 (1993).
9. See, e.g., Thomas J. Lueck, Immigrant Enrollment Rises in New York
City Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1993, at B1.
10. A lobbyist for the Los Angeles Unified School District recently stated
that the District had not received cost-of-living increases for three years. Wein-
traub & Frammolino, supra note 2. Big-city school districts across the country
face fiscal deficits, facility overcrowding and teacher shortages. McDONNELL &
HILL, supra note 2, at xiii.
11. Reinhold, supra note 3.
12. MICHAEL A. SHIRES, ET AL., RAND INSTITUTE ON EDUCATION AND TRAIN-
ING, THE EFFECTS OF THE CALIFORNIA VOUCHER INITIATIVE ON PUBLIC EXPENDI-
TURES FOR EDUCATION at xi (1993).
13. See Weintraub & Frammolino, supra note 7.
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concomitant legal issues must be addressed-and resolved-
according to the rule of law. 4
To paraphrase Chief Justice Marshall, certain duties of
government are assigned by law.15 When an injury results
from a failure to perform an assigned duty, the injured party
has a right to resort to the law for a remedy. 16 Cognizant of
these principles, this comment examines the duties of the
California Legislature with regard to local school districts.
Such duties result from a myriad of state laws and state and
federal constitutional mandates;' v where those duties argua-
bly have not been met, California school districts face a seri-
ous legal predicament.
The United States Supreme Court has set forth certain
constitutional mandates regarding state administration of
educational opportunity. In Plyler v. Doe,' 8 the Court held
that state statutes which withhold state funds from local
school districts for the education of children not "legally ad-
mitted"19 to the United States violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 20 As a result, under
the federalist system, state governments have an obligation
to extend education rights afforded to U.S. citizens who re-
side within the state to all state residents regardless of their
status under the immigration laws.2' Faced with a federal
mandate to provide basic education to an increasing number
of students, including nearly forty-five percent of the nation's
immigrant children,22 California has had difficulty in financ-
ing its schools.23
14. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). One element of the political
question doctrine, which bars adjudication of a matter, may be found where
there are no "judicially discoverable and manageable standards." Id. at 189.
Here, as in Baker, a body of law consisting of past precedents may be used to
adjudicate a matter which, since it involves judicial review of legislative action,
arguably involves a political question.
15. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 138 (1803).
16. Id.
17. See discussion infra part II.
18. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
19. Id. at 205.
20. Id. at 230. The Equal Protection Clause provides: "No state shall...
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
21. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230.
22. McDONNELL & HILL, supra note 2, at 4.
23. See id. at 55.
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There are also state constitutional requirements that the
California Legislature provide a basic education to Califor-
nia's children. According to Serrano v. Priest (Serrano II),24
basic education is regarded as a fundamental right.25 Fur-
ther, Serrano held that the Legislature may not condition ed-
ucational opportunity on the taxable wealth of school dis-
tricts. 26 In summary, a Californian has a right to a basic
education,27 and the Legislature has a constitutional duty to
provide one. 28 That duty is reinforced by section 6 of Article
XIII B of the California Constitution, which provides that
"[wihenever the Legislature or any state agency mandates a
new program or higher level of service on any local govern-
ment, the state shall provide a subvention of funds to reim-
burse such local government for the costs .... ,,29 Despite
these constitutional obligations, the burden of financing edu-
cation has increasingly fallen on local school districts, espe-
cially on those with ever-expanding student enrollments.3 °
Thus, the legal problem this comment proposes to resolve in-
volves a remedy for school districts which must bear an un-
fair burden of the state's obligation to provide children with a
basic education.3 1 Specifically, this comment argues that
school districts which have had to accommodate a high influx
of students-while receiving only minimal increased support
from the state-are entitled to reimbursement from the state
for those increased costs.3 2
This comment provides constitutional analysis of the fed-
eral and state mandates applicable to California's school dis-
tricts. 3 It also analyzes California electoral and statutory
24. 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976), cert. denied sub nom. Clowes v. Serrano, 432
U.S. 907 (1977).
25. Id. at 951 (stating that under "state constitutional provisions guaran-
teeing equal protection of the laws ... education is a fundamental interest").
26. Id. at 953.
27. Hayes v. Commission on State Mandates, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 547 (Ct. App.
1992).
28. CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 5.
29. CAL. CONST. art. XIII B, § 6.
30. See McDONNELL & HILL, supra note 2, at xii.
31. See generally Note, Unfulfilled Promises: School Finance Remedies and
State Courts, 104 HARv. L. REV. 1072 (1991) (describing how the remedial phase
of state court decisions requiring equal educational opportunity have been hin-
dered by state political conditions).
32. See discussion infra part IV.
33. See discussion infra parts II.B., II.C.1.
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law pertaining to the implementation of those mandates.34
After suggesting a legal method for local school districts to
obtain relief from the state legislature, the comment consid-
ers whether, against the applicable common law criteria,
such relief would be judicially granted.35
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Fiscal and Material Circumstances of California
School Districts
On a national scale, the fiscal constraints imposed on lo-
cal school districts can best be traced statistically. Since
1981, the federal government's share of public education fi-
nancing has decreased from ten percent to six percent.36
Meanwhile, over the last decade, public school enrollments
have increased approximately 1.5% each year nationwide.
More than two million of those enrolled were immigrant
youth,38 a figure which constitutes at least three percent of
all American youth under age eighteen.39 While immigrant
children thus represent only a small fraction of the nation's
youth, over seventy percent of our nation's immigrant youth
reside in just five states,4" the majority having settled in
California.41
The debate which ensued following Governor Pete Wil-
son's proposal to amend the California Constitution to deny
citizenship to the children of illegal aliens and to cut off
health and education benefits to undocumented immigrants
has included exchanges of factual data of nearly every kind
from all sides of the issue.4 2 Almost universally, the argu-
ments include attempts to assign blame for the fiscal crises
faced by state governmental entities.4" The extent to which
34. See discussion infra part II.C.2.
35. See discussion infra parts III., IV.
36. Michael Winerip, Two Suburbs, a School Tax and Two Attitudes About
It, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1993, at A13.
37. Id.
38. McDONNELL & HILL, supra note 2, at 3.
39. Id. at 3.
40. Id. at 2 (including California, Florida, Illinois, New York, and Texas).
41. Id.
42. See Susan Estrich, The Curse of Specificity-Or Why Politicians Tell
Lies, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1993, at M2; Reinhold, supra note 3, at Al; Wood,
supra note 2, at 12.
43. See generally Estrich, supra note 42, at M2; Reinhold, supra note 3, at
Al; Wood, supra note 2, at 12.
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these crises are real can be demonstrated by examining local
school districts.
In Los Angeles, approximately one-fifth of the school pop-
ulation is foreign-born.44 The recent influx of students from
foreign countries accounted for twenty-three percent of school
spending.45 Yet despite increased enrollments, funding for
Los Angeles schools fell nearly twenty percent between Sep-
tember 1990 and January 1992,46 leaving the district "near
collapse."47 Pupil-teacher ratios have increased and essential
services, as well as repair and maintenance activity, have
been cut.48  According to a recent study, the district is
"profoundly troubled and . . .finding it difficult to provide
sound educational experiences to any of [its] students."49
Moreover, the budget crisis, overcrowding, and a shortage of
bilingual staff constrain the district's efforts to educate recent
immigrants.50
Similar funding-service disparities have occurred else-
where in California, including the Bay Area. While Los
Gatos schools decreased their pupil-teacher ratios and en-
hanced services as a result of a local property tax initiative,
budget cuts have eliminated faculty, music teachers, librari-
ans, busing, after-school sports, and increased class size in
many of the area's largest school districts."1 Yet to the extent
that significant per-pupil funding disparities exist between
state school districts, state constitutional questions of equal
protection emerge.52 To understand the federal scheme
under which California's school financing process must oper-
ate, however, the role of the federal government must first be
explored.
44. McDONNELL & HILL, supra note 2, at 3.
45. Reinhold, supra note 3.
46. McDONNELL & HILL, supra note 2, at 51.
47. See Schools for Immigrants, SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 16, 1993, at B14.
48. Id.
49. McDONNELL & HILL, supra note 2, at 54.
50. Id. at 55.
51. Aleta Payne, Los Gatos' Parcel Tax Has Kept Schools at the Head of the
Class, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Sept. 5, 1993, at Al, A18.
52. This question remains entirely open following the depublication of Ser-
rano III. See Serrano v. Priest (Serrano III), 226 Cal. Rptr. 584 (Ct. App. 1986),
vacated and review granted sub nom. Placentia Unified School Dist. v. Riles,
723 P.2d 1248 (Cal. 1986) (en banc), transferred sub nom. Serrano v. Priest, 763
P.2d 852 (Cal. 1988).
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B. The Federal Equal Protection Mandate Pertaining to
Education
As indicated above,53 the United States Supreme Court,
in Plyler, examined the constitutionality of a statutory classi-
fication used to allocate resources to local school districts. 54
The factual context of the examination was whether the
state's failure to reimburse local school boards for the costs of
educating children who were unable to demonstrate the le-
gality of their presence in the United States (or the school
board's imposition of tuition on those children) violated the
Equal Protection Clause. 55 Although the Court recognized
that education is not a fundamental right and that undocu-
mented aliens could not be treated as a suspect class, 6 the
court found that the classification warranted intermediate
scrutiny57 because the statute injured a discrete class of chil-
dren not responsible for their own legal status.58
In determining the level of review to be applied, the
Court distinguished education from all other forms of gov-
ernmental "benefit[s]."5 9 The constituent elements of the dis-
tinction included the "importance of education in maintaining
our basic institutions, and the lasting impact of its depriva-
tion on the life of the child."6" The majority supported this
assessment at length, citing case precedents, which recog-
nized the vital role public education plays in preserving our
democratic system of government by transmitting knowledge
53. See supra text accompanying notes 18-20.
54. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 227 (1982); see also Julie K Underwood &
William E. Sparkman, School Finance Litigation: A New Wave of Reform, 14
HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 517, 527.
55. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 215.
56. Id. at 223 (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,
28-39 (1973)). Despite the fact that the Rodriguez Court found no right to edu-
cation under the Constitution, the Court "noted that 'some identifiable quan-
tum of education' might be required." Peter B. Edelman, The Next Century of
Our Constitution: Rethinking Our Duty to the Poor, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 33 (foot-
note omitted).
57. The United States Supreme Court applies three levels of scrutiny in
evaluating state action against the constraints of the Fourteenth Amendment's
guarantee of "equal protection of the laws": rationality review (lowest level),
heightened, or intermediate scrutiny (middle level), and strict scrutiny (highest
level). See generally GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 601-08 (12th ed.,
1991).
58. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223-24.
59. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982).
60. Id.
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essential to useful participation in civic affairs, and by culti-
vating the fundamental values necessary to maintain that
system.61 The majority also acknowledged the importance of
education in providing persons with the basic tools to lead
economically productive lives, a benefit to society as well as to
the individual.6 2 Deprivation of these tools, the Court con-
cluded, takes an "inestimable toll" on the "social, economic,
intellectual, and psychological well-being of the individual."63
In addition to measuring the individual and institutional
moment of education, the Court weighed another societal
value in reaching its determination by characterizing educa-
tion in terms of the Equal Protection Clause. 64 Because one
of the objectives of the Clause was "the abolition of govern-
mental barriers presenting unreasonable obstacles to ad-
vancement on the basis of individual merit,"65 the Court rea-
soned that denial of education to an isolated group would
contravene one of the purposes underlying the adoption of the
Clause.66 More particular to the classification at issue, the
children of a -disfavored group would be deprived of the
means necessary to "raise the level of esteem in which [the
group] is held by the majority."67 Thus, one practical value of
education, the Court seemed to say, is the functional
equivalent of that envisioned for the Equal Protection Clause:
to afford a remedy for persons treated unfairly by circum-
stances beyond their control. A law which impedes a child's
61. Id. at 222-23. As additional support for its holding, the Court cited
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and
local governments.... It is the very foundation of good citizenship.
Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural
values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping
him to adjust normally to his environment.... [Ilt is doubtful that any
child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the
opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has
undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all
on equal terms.
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 222-23.
62. Id. at 221.
63. Id. at 222.
64. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221-22 (1982).
65. See id. at 221-22.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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ability to obtain an education inherently conflicts with the
Equal Protection Clause.68
As demonstrated above, the Court accounted for the indi-
vidual and societal costs of denying children, on the basis of
their legal status, a basic education. 69 The extent of these
costs, the opinion concludes, was such that the discrimina-
tory classification could not be considered rational unless it
furthered some substantial state goal. 70 The opinion held
that the evidence did not support a finding that the classifica-
tion advanced a substantial state interest.71 Neither the in-
terests of avoiding the harsh economic effects of illegal immi-
gration, providing a high quality education to citizens and
legal residents, nor providing education only to children
likely to remain within the state after receiving an education
were found to be advanced in a significant way.72 Indicating
that the classification simply bore no more than a tenuous
factual relationship to the ends named by the State, the opin-
ion states: "Whatever savings might be achieved by denying
these children an education, they are wholly insubstantial in
light of the costs involved to these children, the State, and the
Nation."7
3
While Plyler clearly requires state governments to ex-
tend education rights without regard to a child's status under
the immigration laws, a line of cases beginning with San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez74 limits the
standard of federal equal protection review of school financ-
ing formulae to mere rationality. 75 In effect, funding dispari-
ties are constitutionally justified by a showing that they are
rationally related to a legitimate state interest (usually local
control of the schools) while absolute educational depriva-
68. See id. at 226. Justice Brennan's opinion emphasizes the "special con-
stitutional sensitivity" required in examining the status of children "present in
this country through no fault of their own." Id.
69. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 224 (1982).
70. Id.
71. Id at 230.
72. Id. at 228-30 (note that the Court explicitly assumed the legitimacy of
the state's purported interest in singling out students likely to remain within
the state's borders in order to analyze the ends-means relationship).
73. Id. at 230.
74. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
75. Underwood & Sparkman, supra note 54, at 521.
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tion, at least in the "unique circumstances" 7 6 of Plyler, must
be justified against heightened equal protection review.77
Ordinarily, neither strict scrutiny nor intermediate scru-
tiny apply to federal equal protection claims against public
school financing systems due to the lack of suspect classifica-
tion or fundamental interest.78 According to San Antonio,
wealth classifications, by themselves, do not constitute a sus-
pect class.79 Moreover, were wealth considered suspect, clas-
sification by school district wealth, as opposed to individual
wealth, would not meet the criteria established to define sus-
pect classifications: isolation, immutable characteristics, and
political powerlessness.8 0 There is no fundamental interest
in education, the Court held, because the interest was neither
"explicitly" nor "implicitly" protected under the Constitu-
tion.81 Thus, in the absence of a suspect class or a fundamen-
tal right, and notwithstanding the "unique circumstances" of
Plyler, rationality review will apply.82
The scope of the above standard, however, remains at is-
sue. Despite the application of the lowest level of equal pro-
tection review, the holding in Papasan v. Allain83 indicates
that a challenged school financing formula will not be auto-
matically upheld. In Papasan, the Court recognized that San
Antonio did not "purport to validate all funding variations
that might result from a State's public school funding deci-
sion."84 The rationality of statutory-based funding dispari-
ties is a factual determination,8 5 a determination not reached
by the Court in Papasan because the lower courts had not
adjudicated the issue.8 6
76. "We have not extended [the Plyler] holding beyond the 'unique circum-
stances,' that provoked its 'unique confluence of theories and rationales.'"
Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 459 (1988) (footnotes omitted).
77. See Edelman, supra note 56, at 39; Underwood & Sparkman, supra note
53, at 521-22.
78. San Antonio, 411 U.S.at 33-34, 61-62.
79. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
80. See id.
81. Id. at 35.
82. See Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 458-59 (1988); Un-
derwood & Sparkman, supra note 54, at 523.
83. 478 U.S. 265 (1986).
84. Underwood & Sparkman, supra note 54, at 524 (citing Papasan, 478
U.S. at 287).
85. Id.
86. Id.
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Yet, the Court concluded that the factual differences be-
tween the challenge brought in Papasan and that brought in
San Antonio provided a sufficient basis for the plaintiff in
Papasan to allege an equal protection violation.s 7 It is thus
useful to note that the challenge brought in San Antonio in-
volved an attack on the overall system of state school finance
by implicating that system in an unfair distribution of funds
raised through local property taxes, while Papasan merely
challenged certain disparities resulting from the state's
method of compensating school districts for lost revenues. 8
Although courts now apply the rational-basis test to evaluate
federal equal protection claims based on funding inequities
between poor and wealthy districts, the question remains,
given the language of Papasan, whether courts will continue
to "accept local control of public education as a legitimate
state purpose."89 Posed in Justice White's dissenting opinion
in San Antonio, the question turns on whether districts "with
a low per-pupil... tax base" are afforded a "realistic choice"
in means to raise per-pupil expenditures in order to reach ed-
ucational objectives.90 As discussed below, 91 this question
was raised and briefly considered by the California Supreme
Court when it resolved in a dissimilar fashion a state claim
that funding inequities violated equal protection principles.
C. School Financing Requirements in California
1. State Equal Protection
In the wake of San Antonio v. Rodriguez, the California
Supreme Court held in Serrano v. Priest (Serrano 11)92 that,
for the purposes of determining compliance with state equal
protection provisions, the state public school financing sys-
tem would be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny.93 The court
previously had determined, on adequate and independent
87. Id. (citing Papasan, 478 U.S. at 287-89).
88. Even under federal equal protection analysis, which is clearly more def-
erential to state legislation than is equal protection analysis conducted under
the California Constitution, such litigation can be brought. Id.
89. Id. at 525.
90. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 64-65 (1973)
(White, J. dissenting).
91. See discussion infra part II.C.
92. 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976), cert. denied sub nom. Clowes v. Serrano, 432
U.S. 907 (1977).
93. Id. at 952.
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state grounds, that education is a state fundamental right,
and that "discrimination in educational opportunity on the
basis of district wealth involves a suspect classification."94
Although the state's equal protection guarantees were "sub-
stantially the equivalent of" those in the Federal Constitu-
tion, the "independent vitality" of California law, in the ab-
sence of judicial constraints imposed by federalism, (notably
deference accorded to a state legislature by the federal court
of last resort regarding local matters for lack of expertise in
those matters), demanded a different analysis of education as
a state constitutional right.95 Because of the "distinctive and
priceless function of education in . . . society," and because
"education is essential to a free enterprise democracy, is uni-
versally relevant . . . [and] is so important that [California]
made it compulsory," the court treated education as a funda-
mental right.96
Under state equal protection analysis, the existing public
school financing system, having been shown to allocate edu-
cational opportunity to students on the basis of the taxable
wealth of the district in which they lived, was held unconsti-
tutional because it denied equal protection of the laws in vio-
lation of the California Constitution. 97 Since the state financ-
ing system could not be supported by other constitutional
provisions, the system was invalidated. 98 Despite the appli-
cation of the "strict scrutiny" standard whereby the govern-
ment must meet the burden of showing that the means are
necessary to achieve a compelling public purpose, the court
expressed doubt that even a rational relationship could be
shown between the asserted "end of maximizing local initia-
tive and a system which provides realistic options to exercise
such initiative only in proportion to district wealth . .. ."9
Essentially, this observation reflected the court's earlier pro-
nouncement that the availability of local tax measures to
94. See id. at 949-51 (upholding Serrano v. Priest (Serrano I), 487 P.2d
1241 (Cal. 1971), which determined that district wealth classifications are sus-
pect and education is a fundamental interest).
95. Id. at 950, 952.
96. Serrano I, 487 P.2d 1241, 1258.
97. Serrano v. Priest (Serrano II), 557 P.2d 929, 953, 957-58 (Cal. 1976),
cert. denied sub nom. Clowes v. Serrano, 432 U.S. 907 (1977).
98. Id. at 958.
99. Id. at 953 n.49 (citing Justice White's dissenting opinion in San Antonio
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 63-70 (1972), for comparison).
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meet educational objectives was a "cruel illusion"100 for poor
school districts, inherently unable to pass such measures.
The central holding of Serrano, that education is a funda-
mental interest under state equal protection principles and
"denials of basic educational equality on the basis of district
residence are subject to strict scrutiny," has been recently re-
affirmed by the California Supreme Court in Butt v. State of
California. 101
In Butt, the resident children of the Richmond Unified
School District were to have been deprived of six weeks, or
almost one-fifth, of the standard 175 day California school
term in accordance with a school closure plan.102 The
planned closure was the school district's response to its im-
pending fiscal insolvency and its inability to obtain emer-
gency aid from the State.10 3 At trial, the court had found that
the State, since it has plenary constitutional responsibility
for the operation of the common school system, had a duty to
intervene to protect students' rights to basic education.
10 4
The Supreme Court of California affirmed the existence of
that duty, stating that the "State is obliged to intervene when
a local district's fiscal problems would otherwise deny its stu-
dents basic educational equality, unless the State can demon-
strate a compelling reason" for not doing so.
10 5
2. The Electoral Propositions
Following the Serrano I and II litigation, the enactment
of Proposition 13 in 1978 forced the California Legislature to
assume greater responsibility for financing education. 10 6 By
limiting the taxes. which can be imposed on real property to
one percent of full market value,10 7 the measure induced the
Legislature to enact new, centralized statutory formulae in
educational financing. 10 The formulae allocated to local gov-
ernments revenue earned from a uniform, drastically re-
100. Id. (citing Serrano v. Priest (Serrano I), 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971)).
101. 842 P.2d 1240, 1256 (Cal. 1992).
102. Id. at 1252.
103. Id. at 1253.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1256.
106. Joseph T. Henke, Financing Public Schools in California: The After-
math of Serrano v. Priest and Proposition 13, 21 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 2 (1986).
107. CAL. CONST. art. XIII A.
108. See Henke, supra note 106 at 1; CAL. EDUC. CODE § 41060 (West 1990).
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duced, statewide property tax, with school districts receiving
funds based on their past budgets. 10 9 Gradually, the state
legislature moved to equalize per student expenditures
among school districts. 110 Today, the rights of school districts
to raise local revenue are limited to such supplemental meas-
ures as student fees, special taxes, sale or lease of school
property, intergovernmental transfers, and charitable
donations. 1
These rights, limited though they may be in a legal
sense,1 1 2 have been drained of practical vitality. Although
the rights of local districts to raise local revenue were created
to supplement existing state obligations, 113 the State has
supplanted those obligations by appropriating funds other-
wise available to support local measures. 1 4 For his 1992-93
budget, Governor Wilson shifted $1.3 billion in local property
tax revenues from local governments to school and commu-
nity college districts." 5 For the 1993-94 budget, "a 2.6 billion
dollar permanent shift in local revenues from local govern-
ments to K-12 school districts and community colleges" has
been projected." 6 The shifts did not increase available funds
to school districts; rather, they reduced the state General
Fund contributions to the districts. 11 7 The consequence of
the diversion of local funds for state expenditures is a de-
crease in local ability to tax for supplemental purposes. In
short, local governmental agencies must raise taxes to con-
tinue providing the same local services or cut services to re-
flect current local revenue.
In 1979, California voters passed Proposition 4, thereby
adding Article XIII B to the state constitution."" Imposing
spending limits on all local governments, the measure limits
annual appropriations increases to those made necessary by
changes in the cost of living and population growth. Popula-
tion growth is to be determined by any means chosen by the
109. Henke, supra note 106, at 23 (footnote omitted).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 24.
112. Available supplemental revenue is "minuscule" in comparison to fund-
ing provided by the state education budget. See id. at 35.
113. See id. at 24.
114. SHIRES et al., supra note 12, at 63-65.
115. Id. at 63.
116. Id. at 65.
117. Id. at 63.
118. CAL. CONST. art. XIII B, § 1.
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Legislature which reflects the federal census and, in special
circumstances, by city and county agency assessments of em-
ployment activity. 119 Revenues obtained by local governmen-
tal entities in excess of appropriations limits were to be re-
turned to taxpayers.
120
Illustrating the centralized nature of California's educa-
tional financing scheme, Proposition 98, adopted in 1988,
amended Article XIII B to transfer half of any excess revenue
to the state school fund for the support of school and commu-
nity college districts. 12' The provisions of Proposition 98 also
constitute the framework of education finance in Califor-
nia. 122 Setting a baseline level of funding outlays from the
State, Proposition 98 permits the State to spend less than the
baseline during bad economic times.1 23
3. The Fiscal Relationships Between State and Local
Governmental Bodies
Section 6 of Article XIII B of the California Constitution
directs that "[w]henever the Legislature or any State Agency
mandates a new program or higher level of service on any
local government, the State shall provide a subvention of
funds to reimburse such local government for the costs of
such program or increased level of service."1 24 While reim-
bursement as a general principle is easily stated, the applica-
tion of XIII B involves certain difficulties, 25 difficulties exac-
erbated by the legal complexities of education funding.
126
In City of Sacramento v. State, 27 the California Supreme
Court delineated the scope of the subvention requirement by
examining the purpose of XIII B's adoption. The intent of the
provision, the court found, was to prevent the State from
transferring the costs of government from itself to local agen-
119. Id.
120. See CAL. CONST. art. XIII B, § 2.
121. See id. art. XVI, § 8.5; see also id. art. XIII B, § 2; California Teachers
Ass'n. v. Huff, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 699, 701 (Ct. App. 1992).
122. SHoRES ET AL., supra note 12, at 9 n.10.
123. Id. at 71; CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 8(b).
124. CAL. CONST. art. XIII B, § 6.
125. Hayes v. Comm'n on State Mandates, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 547, 555, (Ct.
App. 1992).
126. One court described the California system of financing its public educa-
tional system as "Byzantine in its intricacy and complexity." Huff, 7 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 707.
127. 785 P.2d 522 (Cal. 1990).
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cies. 12' Local governmental entities required protection be-
cause their taxing and spending powers were restricted.
1 29
The court found that no reimbursement of local agencies is
required for incidental costs resulting from the enactment of
a state law.1 3 0 Rather, local agencies may be entitled to sub-
vention only where state law requires them to provide gov-
ernmental services to residents. 13 1 When the State "freely
chooses to impose on local agencies any peculiarly 'govern-
mental' cost which they were not previously required to ab-
sorb," reimbursement is required.1 3 2 Thus, where a federal
mandate leaves the state free to choose the fiscal method of
its compliance, any costs of compliance shifted by the state to
local governments will be subject to subvention.133
In both City of Sacramento v. State and County of Los
Angeles v. State (referred to by the court in Sacramento),
suits for reimbursement for costs imposed on local agencies
by laws requiring the provision of unemployment benefits to
governmental employees failed.13 4 The California Supreme
Court found that no "service to the public" was involved and
that, because private employers were required to provide
similar benefits, the laws were generally applicable and not
an imposition of a state policy "uniquelly]" on local
governments. 135
In Lucia Mar Unified School District v. Honig,'36 on the
other hand, the court held that "by requiring each local school
district to contribute part of the expense of educating its
handicapped students in state-run schools-a cost previously
absorbed entirely by the state-the Legislature created a
'new program' subject to subvention under Article XIII B, sec-
tion 6."117 Thus, it appears that state laws directed at local
128. Id. at 531.
129. Article XIII B, § 6 was designed "to preclude the state from shifting to
local agencies the financial responsibility for providing public services in view of
these restrictions on the taxing and spending power of the local entities." Lucia
Mar Unified Sch. Dist. v. Honig, 750 P.2d 318, 322 (Cal. 1988).
130. Lucia Mar, 750 P.2d at 322.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Hayes v. Comm'n on State Mandates, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 547, 563-64 (Ct.
App. 1992).
134. City of Sacramento v. State, 785 P.2d 522, 530 (Cal. 1990).
135. Id. (comparing the court's considerations in County of Los Angeles with
those present in City of Sacramento) (citation omitted).
136. 750 P.2d 318, 327 (Cal. 1988).
137. Id. at 322.
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public entities which have no parallel in the private sector
are subject to the reimbursement requirement. P
Whether and to what extent a local agency is entitled to
reimbursement is initially determined by the Commission on
State Mandates. 138 Established by the state legislature in
1985, the Commission consists of the Controller, the Treas-
urer, the Director of Finance, and the Director of the Office of
Planning and Research and a member of the public appointed
by the Governor and approved by the Senate. 13 9 To resolve a
local agency claim, the Commission provides a hearing to de-
termine whether the costs incurred by the agency or school
district were "mandated by the state," a term defined as
follows:
any increased costs which a local agency or school district
is required to incur after July 1, 1980, as a result of any
statute enacted on or after January 1, 1975, or any execu-
tive order implementing any statute enacted on or after
January 1, 1975, which mandates a new program or
higher level of service of an existing program within the
meaning of Section 6 of Article XIII B of the California
Constitution. 140
Whether the Commission, or a court, should find a man-
date also depends on common law considerations, for the
term "mandate" also has a judicial definition. According to
Long Beach Unified School District v. State,141 since the pur-
pose of XIII B Section 6 was to prevent the transfer of state
fiscal responsibility to local governments, the application of
its terms must reflect that purpose. The term, "mandate,"
therefore, means "orders" or "commands."'42 Such concepts
as orders and commands necessarily include executive or-
ders. According to Long Beach, then, executive orders, as
well as statutes, are subject to reimbursement. 14 Whatever
its basis of decision, should the Commission find a reimburs-
able mandate, it must report its findings to the Legislature,
which may act to appropriate the estimated costs of the man-
138. CAL. GOVT CODE, § 17525 (West 1993).
139. Id.
140. Id. § 17514.
141. 275 Cal. Rptr. 449, 461 (Ct. App. 1990).
142. Id.
143. Id.
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date for purposes of reimbursement. 14 The Commission's
decisions are subject to judicial review.
Although school districts have had mandates to increase
services in accordance with higher enrollments since a time
prior to the promulgation of XIII B, in recent years mandates
and orders directing school districts to take particular costly
actions have related directly, though not explicitly, to costs
imposed on districts by the consequences of immigration.
Just one example was the order requiring all secondary
school teachers in the Los Angeles Unified School District to
undergo special training to address the district's deficiency in
educating students who speak little or no English.' The or-
der was issued to force the district to fulfill the requirements
of a master plan adopted in 1988, which, according to the
school board president, had not been met due to financial cri-
ses. 1 4 6  To enforce the order, state education officials
threatened to withhold funds necessary for bilingual educa-
tion programs from the school district. 147 To comply, the dis-
trict would send high school and middle school students home
for four days, during which time the teachers would receive
the mandated training. 148 The costs of the training and the
four-day extension of the school year might be recoverable
under this comment's proposed remedy.
III. STATEMENT OF THE LEGAL PROBLEM
As the preceding material suggests, certain California
school districts face a legal predicament occasioned, at least
in part, by large influxes of immigrant children absent ade-
quate influxes of capital. 149 The outer contours of that pre-
dicament are delineated by federal and state mandates. 50
By prohibiting states which afford resident children a basic
education from depriving any of those children an education
on the basis of the child's legal status under United States
immigration laws, the federal mandate limits the legal op-
tions a state government may take to avert the economic
144. CAL. GOv'T CODE, § 17500-751.1.
145. Stephanie Brommer, L.A. Expands Bilingual Program, SAN JOSE MER-
CURY NEWS, Jan. 9, 1994, at B3.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See discussion supra part II.B.
150. See discussion supra parts II.B, 1.C.
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costs of educating immigrant children. Fundamentally, while
San Antonio limits the availability of a federal remedy to im-
poverished school districts, Plyler reinforces the direct re-
sponsibility state governments, such as California's, hold
over local school districts because a state, under Plyler, may
not permit a school district to limit new enrollments by refer-
ence to immigration laws. Thus, a school district receiving
inadequate funding necessarily would look to state govern-
ment, or to local revenue, for a remedy. Because California's
electoral propositions limited school districts' ability to raise
revenue and imposed the reimbursement requirement upon
the Legislature, it appears that school districts have little
choice but to turn to the State.
In the context of federal and state constitutional man-
dates, examination of the evolution of California's school fi-
nancing formulae, as well as the consequent material circum-
stances of school districts, raises questions concerning the
validity of the legal relationships existing between the Legis-
lature and local school districts. Moreover, regardless of the
facial constitutionality of California's current financing
scheme, the manner in which that scheme is executed may
violate state constitutional provisions. 151 To place those
151. Certain sections of the California Constitution impose duties on the
Legislature with regard to education, among them are:
(1) CAL. CONST. art IX, § 1: "A general diffusion of knowledge and intelligence
being essential to the preservation of the rights and liberties of the people, the
Legislature shall encourage by all suitable means the promotion of intellectual,
scientific, moral, and agricultural improvement."
(2) CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 5: "The Legislature shall provide for a system of com-
mon schools by which a free school shall be kept up and supported in each dis-
trict at least six months in every year, after the first year in which a school has
been established."
(3) CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 8: "From all state revenues there shall first be set
apart the monies to be applied by the state for support of the public school sys-
tem and public institutions of higher education."
With regard to a California state equal protection claim, the California
Supreme Court, in addition to overturning the existing school financing system,
stated:
Although an equal expenditure level per pupil in every district is not
educationally sound or desirable because of differing educational
needs, equality of educational opportunity requires that all school dis-
tricts possess an equal ability in terms of revenue to provide students
with substantially equal opportunities for learning. The system before
the court fails in this respect, for it gives high-wealth districts a sub-
stantial advantage in obtaining higher quality staff, program expan-
sion and variety, beneficial teacher-pupil ratios and class sizes, modern
equipment and materials, and high quality buildings.
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questions before the court, then, school districts must ask
whether the California Legislature has affirmatively shifted
fiscal responsibility for the costs of educating immigrant chil-
dren to local districts in violation of state education and equal
protection mandates; and, if so, what remedies are available
to an injured school district.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Criteria for Reimbursement
The California Supreme Court, in City of Sacramento v.
State, 5 2 reiterated the criteria set forth under County of Los
Angeles v. State,5 3 by which a governmental entity may be
found to be entitled to reimbursement under Article XIII
B. 154 According to City of Sacramento, subvention is required
only when the state compels local governments to provide
new or upgraded "programs that carry out the govern-
mental function of providing services to the public, or,...
to implement a state policy, impose[s] unique require-
ments on local governments [that] do not apply generally
to all residents and entities of the state."1 55
Whether or not a local government's costs were the result
of a "new program" or "increased level of service" within the
meaning of XIII B could be determined by reference to the
intent of the electorate in passing Proposition 4.156 The court
reasoned that the voters had not intended that all local costs
resulting from compliance with state law be reimbursable;
but rather had intended to forestall attempts by the Legisla-
ture to "enact legislation or adopt administrative orders cre-
ating programs to be administered by local agencies, thereby
transferring to those agencies the fiscal responsibility for pro-
viding services which the state believed should be extended to
the public."157 As will be discussed below, Article XIII B re-
imbursement analysis encompasses not only the plain lan-
guage of the provision but the purpose of its adoption.
Serrano v. Priest (Serrano II), 557 P.2d 929, 939 (Cal. 1976), cert. denied sub
nom. Clowes v. Serrano, 432 U.S. 907 (1977).
152. 785 P.2d 522 (Cal. 1990).
153. 729 P.2d 202 (Cal. 1987).
154. City of Sacramento, 785 P.2d at 522, 526, 529-30 (footnotes omitted).
155. Id. at 526 (footnote omitted).
156. Id. at 530.
157. City of Sacramento v. State, 785 P.2d 522, 530 (Cal. 1990) (footnote
omitted).
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B. Application of the Criteria
1. Specific Mandates
With regard to particularized mandates, such as the or-
der issued to the Los Angeles School District mentioned
above, 158 the elements of Article XIII B, section 6 appear rela-
tively easy to meet. The order can be considered a mandate
because, according to Long Beach Unified School District v.
State, the concept of the term "mandate," for the purposes of
Article XIII B, includes executive orders as well as stat-
utes. 159 In defining "mandate," the purpose of Article XIII B's
adoption, rather than the form of an order, is controlling. 16
0
The order that teachers undergo new training-in foreign
cultures, and methods and strategies of teaching limited-
English students-arguably constitutes a "new or upgraded"
program of providing services (i.e. teaching) to the public.
Certainly the order is unique to local governmental entities.
The significance of reimbursement for particularized
mandates, however, truly lies with relatively minor aspects of
the operation of a public school system.' 6 ' Further, singular
claims such as the example given above might not be subject
to strict judicial oversight because the claim may not indicate
the relevance of the wealth-related funding disparities with
which a district must cope.
2. General Mandates
The circumstances faced by school districts serving large
numbers of immigrant children are similar to those faced by
the school district plaintiff in Lucia Mar. 162 Although a man-
date to serve such children has existed for many years, the
increased limitation on the availability of means to pay for
the service is recent, as the diversion of local taxes to comple-
ment state funds in order to match, rather than increase,
past budgets began in 1992.163
158. See supra text accompanying notes 142-45.
159. Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist. v. State, 275 Cal. Rptr. 449,461 (Ct. App.
1990).
160. Id.
161. This is demonstrated by the fact that the true costs of educating immi-
grants concentrated in particular school districts are not accounted for by
equalized per-pupil funding formulae. In comparison, disparities resulting
from individual orders are minimal. See discussion supra part II.A.
162. Lucia Mar Unified Sch. Dist. v. Honig, 750 P.2d 318, 320 (Cal. 1988).
163. See SHIsmS et al., supra note 12, at 63.
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It appears that such new financial obstacles, combined
with pre-existing state-mandated programs, constitute
"higher level[s] of service" which school districts are com-
pelled to provide. Logically, this is true inasmuch as school
districts which must educate higher numbers of students
without commensurate financial support, in effect, must pro-
vide an increased level of service. The Supreme Court of Cal-
ifornia has recognized this logic by defining the term "higher
level of service" as "state mandated increases in the services
provided by local agencies in existing 'programs.' "164
While some may argue that the state funding scheme,
which equalizes district funding by allocating resources ac-
cording to units of average daily attendance and provides cer-
tain categorical aid to districts based on other factors, 165 ac-
counts for influxes of new students, the circumstances of
districts containing high concentrations of immigrants indi-
cate otherwise. As previously discussed, new students re-
quire new teachers, new programs, and larger facilities-re-
quirements only partially funded by the state's financing
scheme. 166
According to California common law, it is clear that the
public intended that the fiscal responsibility for providing
these services reside at the state, rather than local, level.' 6 '
Although only one of the following elements must be met, it
164. County of Los Angeles v. State, 729 P.2d 202, 208 (Cal. 1987).
165. Butt v. State, 842 P.2d 1240, 1247 n.11 (Cal. 1992).
166. This fact was explicitly recognized in Proposition 98, which reads in
part: "The People of the State and California find and declare that: (a) Califor-
nia schools are the fastest growing in the nation .... (b) Classes in California's
schools have become so seriously overcrowded that California now has the larg-
est classes of any state in the nation." Proposition 98, § 2.
167. "Since its admission to the Union, California has assumed specific re-
sponsibility for a statewide public education system open on equal terms to all."
Butt, 842 P.2d at 1247. To reach this conclusion, the California Supreme Court
cited the following: "The education of the children of the state is an obligation
which the state is an obligation which the state took over to itself by the adop-
tion of the Constitution." San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist. v. Johnson, 479 P.2d
669, 677 (Cal. 1971), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1012 (1971) (quoting Piper v. Big
Pine Sch. Dist., 226 P. 926, 928 (Cal. 1924)); "School districts are the agencies of
the state for local operation of the state school system." Hall v. City of Taft, 302
P.2d 574, 577 (Cal. 1956); "[Tlhe State's ultimate responsibility for public edu-
cation cannot be delegated to any other entity." Id. at 577. "[A] system of com-
mon schools means one system, which shall be applicable to all the common
schools within the state." Kennedy v. Miller, 32 P. 558, 559 (Cal. 1893);
"[M]anagement and control of the public schools [is] a matter of state care and
supervision." Id. at 558.
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appears that the costs of educating immigrant children in-
volve both the provision of services to the public and the im-
position of unique requirements on local governments. Dis-
parity in educational opportunity, a service, has been the
source of successful constitutional claims against the state.168
Furthermore, the requirement of accepting immigrant chil-
dren is unique to school districts, self-evidently not incidental
to any generally applicable law.
In City of Sacramento, the court distinguished Lucia
Mar, 169 reasoning, that in Lucia Mar, the "education of hand-
icapped students was clearly a traditional governmental 'ser-
vice to the public,'" and it qualified as a "program" on that
basis. 170 According to the City of Sacramento court, the func-
tion of educating handicapped children "had long been per-
formed by the state, and the only issue was whether the be-
lated shifting of the program's costs to local governments
made it 'new' for subvention purposes."171 To resolve the is-
sue in the negative, the court stated, would undermine a cen-
tral purpose of Article XIII B, section 6: preventing the
transfer of the cost of government from the state to local
agencies. 17
2
No similar distinctions can be drawn with regard to the
education of immigrant children. Perhaps the most forceful
distinction that can be drawn relates to the manner in which
local districts have been deprived of supplemental means to
raise revenue. Local property taxes were appropriated by the
State and added to the education fund;173 thus, the depriva-
tion of means was indirect-an additional reduction in the
ability of a district to raise revenue for local purposes. In Lu-
cia Mar, the state statute explicitly required a diversion of
district funds to the State for the purposes of educating chil-
dren.174 Such a distinction should not apply against poor dis-
tricts faced with a state mandate to provide an education to
168. See Butt, 842 P.2d at 1251; Serrano v. Priest (Serrano II), 557 P.2d 929,
959 (Cal. 1976), cert. denied sub nom. Clowes v. Serrano, 432 U.S. 907 (1977)
(Richardson, dissenting).
169. City of Sacramento v. State, 785 P.2d 522, 531 (Cal. 1990).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. SiREs et al., supra note 12, at 63.
174. Lucia Mar Unified Sch. Dist. v. Honig, 750 P.2d 318, 320 (Cal. 1988).
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large numbers of immigrant children, for it would undermine
the purposes of XIII B, section 6.175
C. The Application of Equal Protection Criteria
State equal protection principles provide additional rea-
sons why overburdened school districts should be entitled to
reimbursement. 176 In the context of the equalized funding
formulae, enacted after Serrano effectively condemned local
taxation as the primary source of district revenue, one equal
protection argument asserts that locally derived revenues are
"essential revenues disguised as supplements."177 In other
words, the reasoning of Serrano should apply because wealth-
based funding disparities exist despite the State's allocation
of funds on an equalized per student basis.
The factual basis of the Serrano decision included a
statewide financing scheme which relied on locally set ad
valorem levies.'17  State funding support was conditioned on
the district taxing itself at a certain minimum, prescribed
rate per amount of assessed property value. 1 79 If a district
met the prescribed level, it was guaranteed equalized funding
per student, regardless of its ability to raise revenue.18 0 Any
additional school district expenditures required additional lo-
cal levies;'' thus, a direct relationship could be established
between a local district's capability to offer its residents edu-
cational opportunity and the taxable wealth of the district.
No such direct relationship between district wealth and
educational opportunity can be shown under the current
state financing scheme. A plaintiff under today's financing
scheme, however, can point to wealth-related funding dispar-
175. Analogously, according to a court decision construing "mandate" to
mean "orders" and "commands" as well as statutes: "It is clear that the primary
concern of the voters was the increased financial burdens being shifted to local
government, not the form in which those burdens appeared." Long Beach Uni-
fied Sch. Dist. v. State, 275 Cal. Rptr. 449, 464 (Ct. App. 1990).
176. "It... appears well settled that the California Constitution makes pub-
lic education uniquely a fundamental concern of the State and prohibits main-
tenance and operation of the common public school system in a way which de-
nies basic educational equality to the students of particular districts." Butt v.
State, 842 P.2d 1240, 1251 (Cal. 1992).
177. Henke, supra note 106, at 36.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. See id.
181. See id. at 36-37.
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ities resulting from the supplemental funding scheme 8 2 and
the centralized funding per student formulae.
According to one scholar, the "essence of Serrano is that
districts should have equal ability per student to raise reve-
nue."1s 3 Arguably, Serrano is violated by district funding
levels so low that supplemental revenues are essential for
school districts to provide children with a basic education.
When poor districts are unable to obtain sufficient supple-
mental income, the fact that school districts in affluent areas
can provide their students with substantially greater educa-
tional opportunity calls into question the constitutionality of
the financing scheme. The fact that the opportunity results
from, for instance, parcel taxes in an affluent residential dis-
trict rather than an ad valorem tax is an unconvincing dis-
tinction. As discussed above, substantial inequities currently
exist between school districts' ability to perform the same
designated functions. For example, the previous comparison
between the Los Gatos School District and neighboring Bay
Area districts reveals easily quantifiable disparities in the al-
location of educational services.18 4
Moreover, the Serrano decision may have foreseen, and
provided for, the kind of quantitative differences among the
school districts in ability to provide educational opportunity
for residents which today exist in California as a result of dis-
parate supplemental revenue sources.'8 5 According to the
language of Serrano:
[I]t can be expected that future years will see an increase
statewide in the ratio of local supplements to other reve-
nues. In such circumstances, the extent of an individual
district's participation in the statewide increase will be
geared to its taxable wealth. To ask, as defendants do,
that we defer our notice of such probable future dispari-
ties to the time of their actual occurrence is to ask that we
ignore inherent defects in the system which we are called
upon to examine.18 6
While the scope of the above language is left undefined, it
would be useful to a plaintiff petitioning a California court for
182. See id. at 36.
183. Id.
184. See supra text accompanying notes 43-51.
185. See Henke, supra note 106, at 35.
186. Serrano v. Priest (Serrano II), 557 P.2d 929, 945 (Cal. 1976), cert. denied
sub nom. Clowes v. Serrano, 432 U.S. 907 (1977).
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review of the role of supplemental revenue in statewide fi-
nancing because it implicitly indicates that other, future leg-
islative decisions to fund California schools would be subject
to an equally strict scrutiny.
On the other hand, there is a powerful qualitative differ-
ence between the pre-Serrano and the post-Serrano financing
schemes.1 8 7 Prior to Serrano, the statewide financing formu-
lae relied primarily on district funding; today, all districts
rely primarily on state financing."" 8 Were a court to find Ser-
rano to be predicated on that basic reliance, "it might con-
clude that any locally raised revenue would be truly supple-
mental,"189 and therefore constitutionally justified.
Further, the addition of Proposition 13 to the California
Constitution set forth requirements not presented before the
California Supreme Court in its Serrano decision. Proposi-
tion 13 fundamentally limited the range of choices available
to the Legislature for fulfilling the apparent requirements set
forth in Serrano. Indeed, the Legislature, following the Ser-
rano decision, had enacted a true "power equalizing" system
whereby local property tax revenue was to be redistributed
from tax-rich to tax-poor districts.1 90 That enactment was
mooted with the passage of Proposition 13, and California
subsequently adopted fully centralized funding.191 The adop-
tion of centralized funding thus occurred under legal circum-
stances more constraining to the Legislature's broad discre-
tion 192 than existed at the time of Serrano.
Any discourse on the qualitative differences between the
education financing schemes, however, would necessarily in-
clude a question concerning the meaning of the language of
Serrano cited above in the statement of the legal problem.
Specifically, the issue raised is whether today's financing for-
mulae are unconstitutionally analogous to the following lan-
guage: "an equal expenditure level per pupil in every district
is not educationally sound or desirable because of differing
187. Henke, supra note 106, at 36.
188. Id. at 37; see CAL. EDUC. CODE § 42238 (West Supp. 1993).
189. Henke, supra note 106, at 37.
190. Id. at 39.
191. Id.
192. "[U]nder the [California] Constitution the Legislature is given broad
discretion in determining the types of programs and services which further the
purposes of education." California Teachers Ass'n v. Huff, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d, 699,
708 (Ct. App. 1992) (footnote omitted).
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needs." 193 Since the funding formulae arguably take inade-
quate account of the differing needs of districts, 1 94 the formu-
lae on these grounds alone may not meet Serrano standards,
for they might not afford "an equal ability in terms of revenue
to provide students with substantially equal opportunity."
195
The differing needs in the case at hand are the result of
annually increasing student enrollments which are them-
selves the result of high concentrations of immigrants in par-
ticular school districts. With relatively large immigrant
populations settling in urban areas, and with thirty percent
of the children in central cities living below the poverty
line, 196 wealth-related inequities in the centralized formulae
can be established by inference. Assuming that substantial
wealth-related inequities can be shown factually by a district
plaintiff, the scope and viability of Serrano's essential holding
necessarily will be addressed.
As discussed above, California courts have upheld and
even extended the central holding of Serrano. 197 Butt, for in-
stance, explained that the State's affirmative duty to inter-
vene to correct "basic 'interdistrict' disparities" exists regard-
less of whether disparate results were intended by the State
or its agents. 198 Thus, where local district officials misman-
age district affairs to the extent that students' fundamental
interest in educational equality may be infringed upon, the
State, rather than the students, must bear the burden im-
posed by the irresponsible actor.
This line of reasoning is especially helpful to school dis-
tricts interested in asserting fact-based petitions for reim-
bursement. Because local control of public schools is not a
compelling interest, and the State had shown no compelling
interest, the Butt trial court lawfully ordered the State and
193. Serrano v. Priest (Serrano II), 557 P.2d 929, 939 (Cal. 1976), cert. denied
sub nom. Clowes v. Serrano, 432 U.S. 907 (1977).
194. Of course the facts which show the formulae that takes inadequate ac-
count of a school district's differing needs would depend on a showing of the
district's needs as against whatever categorical aid the district received. Cate-
gorical aid is the Legislature's method of accounting for the differing needs of
districts based on the diversity of student population. Butt v. State, 842 P.2d
1240, 1247 n.11 (Cal. 1992).
195. Serrano H, 557 P.2d at 939.
196. ROTBERG, supra note 8, at 7.
197. See discussion supra II.C.1.
198. Butt, 842 P.2d at 1249.
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its officials to protect students' rights. 199 The trial court also
constructed a lawful remedy for the district by authorizing
the Superintendent of Public Instruction to assume control of
the school district's affairs.2 ° ° While Serrano had involved a
constitutional challenge to the state public school financing
system, Serrano's progeny now involve the application of the
constitutional principles the decision set forth in formulating
viable remedies. Similarly, Serrano should require strict ju-
dicial oversight of a school district's claim for reimbursement
for state-mandated programs.
V. PROPOSAL
The language of Article XIII B requires the state Legisla-
ture to reimburse local governmental entities for costs attrib-
utable to state-mandated new programs or increased levels of
service. As discussed previously, certain school districts af-
fected by high enrollments of immigrants have had to up-
grade levels of service by providing more classrooms, more bi-
lingual programs, and more teachers to achieve prescribed
educational standards.20 ' While California has required af-
fected school districts to provide certain services, the State
has not afforded districts funds commensurate with the costs
of complying with its mandates. One possible solution is to
show that additional costs incurred by local districts in their
compliance with a mandate to educate immigrant children
constitutes a "new program" or higher "level of service" for
which the district must be reimbursed.
As a means to enforce the Legislature's fulfillment of its
constitutional duties, this comment proposes that local school
districts file claims for reimbursement under Article XIII B,
contending that the Legislature's discretion in fulfilling its
obligations to school districts is subject to strict judicial re-
view according to state equal protection principles. Reim-
bursement should be afforded to districts where particular
costs have been incurred as a result of specific mandates, and
where "unique obligations" have been incurred by local dis-
tricts in compliance with general mandates.
199. Butt v. State, 842 P.2d 1240, 1264 (Cal. 1992).
200. Id.
201. See McDONNELL & HILL, supra note 2, at xi-xiv.
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VI. SUMMATION
To the extent that the public policy issues of immigration
and education can be resolved by the enforcement of existing
law, those issues are legal rather than political. This com-
ment analyzes some of those issues by examining the federal
and state constitutional mandates which frame any potential
resolution to the apparent conflict between the requirements
imposed on all California schools and the means allocated to
certain schools to achieve those requirements.
In particular, the comment examines, in the context of
the federal mandates, California constitutional mandates
which grant resident children a right to a basic education
and prohibit the allocation of educational opportunity on the
basis of district wealth.2 °2 It reviews the evolution of Califor-
nia constitutional and statutory law pertaining to the financ-
ing of public education, and describes the revenue-raising au-
thority invested in particular governmental entities.20 3
The comment sets forth applicable criteria for analyzing
the problem of reimbursement and proposes a remedy by
which school districts might recover costs incurred by com-
plying with state mandates.2 °4 The remedy invokes Califor-
nia constitutional principles which require strict judicial
scrutiny of a claim, without necessarily challenging any stat-
utory scheme as unconstitutional. Since the California
Supreme Court has recently upheld the long-standing princi-
ples upon which the proposed claim is based, the comment
concludes that a fact-laden claim would probably be
successful.
Whatever societal values education may enhance, the
perception of the unique value of education is reflected in the
law. If it is true that "our progress as a nation can be no
swifter than our progress in education,"20 5 then any judicial
failure to enforce state education rights may potentially harm
the progress of the nation. No California court need abdicate
202. See supra text accompanying notes 96-100.
203. See discussion supra part II.C.
204. See discussion supra parts III.C., V.
205. Quoting President John F. Kennedy, in THEODORE C. SORENSEN, KEN-
NEDY 358 (1965).
396 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35
its responsibility in light of the mandates the judiciary is re-
quired to enforce.
Sean R. O'Halloran
